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Addendum to 'Why Vietnam?'

A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION EXISTS

JOHN GITTINGS

The Shadow Presidency

James MacGregor Burns

Twenty Years of Terror & Peace

'Atomic Diplomacy' Christopher Lasch

'A Peril and a Hope' Elinor Langer

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LETTERS

Doctrine of hopelessness

Berkeley, Calif.

Dear Sirs: I want to disagree with a major point in Eric Hobsbawm's stimulating article, "The Pentagon's Dilemma: Goliath and the Guerrilla" [*The Nation*, July 19].

If I understand Mr. Hobsbawm rightly, his answer to the question, "Why is the United States committed in Vietnam in the way that it is?," is threefold: (1) An almost total disregard of the most basic common sense ("Before common sense flies completely out of the window, it is therefore worth taking a look at the nature of modern guerrilla war"); (2) the choice of an inappropriate model for successful anti-guerrilla operations ("That the Mau Mau were defeated in Kenya is no help to the Americans in Vietnam . . ."); and (3) mental illness ("The risk is that the United States, suffering from the well-known disease of infant great powers — a touch of omnipotence — will slide into nuclear war rather than face reality"). We continue to pursue an impossible course in Vietnam either from stupidity or infantile omnipotence or both. . . . I cannot help but find these reasons unsatisfactory, and should like to propose an alternative set.

I believe the United States is pursuing the course of action so well described by Mr. Hobsbawm in his article just because vital interests are directly threatened. The United States Government has laid down the following, I believe, as its total global strategy: (1) At this point in time Socialist governments which do not support actively the notion that national liberation movements ought to be influenced and inspired by Socialist thought are to be tolerated. (2) Those Socialist states which hold the contrary view cannot be tolerated, *as they are presently constituted.* . . . This does not imply that war with a country such as China is prudent. In fact, given this strategic goal, war is likely to produce quite the opposite effect, although carefully applied military operations might be reasonable. . . . (3) In those areas of the world where social change is inevitable, all efforts must be spent in directing those revolutions toward a national capitalist development, having as their characteristics limited land reform, elimination of radical Communist parties and room for foreign investment.

Our policy in Vietnam is nothing other than full-scale implementation of this total strategy. There is no ignorance concerning the infiltration of personnel and materiel from North Vietnam. Otherwise how account for the absence of a concerted attempt to seal the border and the long-awaited appearance of a systematic naval blockade? No, the bombing of North Vietnam has as its purpose the attempt to force renunciation of an *idea*, actively and enthusiastically advocated. . . .

Neither is there any ignorance of the usefulness of destroying guerrillas by bombs unleashed by B-52s which are Guam-based. The purpose here is both twofold and indirect: To indicate to the Chinese the possibility of SAC weaponry being converted to conventional purposes and thereby being used to attack Chinese industrial and nuclear capability with conventional weapons from a noncontinental base, namely Guam. Likewise, the Vietnamese peasant is being shown the dangers of supporting a real revolutionary movement. . . . In short, the purpose of the United States Government in Vietnam is to demonstrate with conclusiveness that no truly revolutionary movement can succeed in the "underdeveloped world." And it has chosen this particular area well, for in Vietnam such a movement clearly would have succeeded, without massive intervention. There is no need to win, although surely this would be best and some think possible. All that is required is that the enemy should not win and the hope that the peoples of the world should decide that if such a movement cannot win in such favorable circumstances, there is no hope. Our purpose in Vietnam is to spread the message of hopelessness.

Paul S. Rosenberg

The new persuasion

Oconomowoc, Wis.

Dear Sirs: Eric Hobsbawm is probably premature in stating in your pages that the United States will be defeated by guerrillas in Vietnam. Having experimented with supplying military support and advisers to the Saigon forces, and more recently with its own air and naval forces, the U.S. will now give up "going guerrilla," and bring in its conventional land combat forces and civil-affairs teams. Under these circumstances it is doubtful that local popular support of the Vietnamese and Vietcong guerrilla tactics will be decisive. . . .

Without failing to be appalled by the unbelievable horror of war, I do not find the expected result unwelcome. The world has reached a stage in its military technology at which no group, no matter how outraged, can resort to arms, as the Vietcong has done, to establish its cause.

THE NATION

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The United States, with some lapses in consistency as in the bombing of North Vietnam, is applying no more force than is necessary to keep the guerrillas from succeeding. Naturally, the more ardent in this country are calling for a higher level of devastation, and the squeamish are objecting to the use of even minimum force. The question is, do the majority of the American people agree in the main with a conventional ground force and civil-affairs teams course of action? . . .

Robert L. Kealy

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Is Violence Un-American?

If it is, so is Old Glory. No nation of modern times is more addicted to violence, legal and illegal, than the United States. But it cannot take its violence straight. It prefers violence mixed with moral hypocrisy.

Los Angeles is a case in point. The headlines provoked the usual flood of editorials and preachments about how much we abhor violence, the senselessness of it, how it never really benefits anyone, and how we must have "order"—meaning, in this context, a return to the old disorder. Genuine order, which must be based on justice and magnanimity, is like the heavenly saints—formally revered but given short shrift in practical affairs.

Isn't it true that our foreign policy has been under strong Pentagon influence since 1945? Who is the international wholesaler of arms today? Who has scattered military aircraft, tanks, bombs, submarines, guns and every variety of weapon throughout Latin America and the Middle East? Who has armed the Pakistanis and the Indians alike? What nation has spent, in all history, what we have spent on arms since 1945—in what we are pleased to call peacetime? What nation has a reputation (and not undeserved) for turning what are basically political questions into military questions, to be settled by violence?

But, it may be objected, the comparison is unfair. War is conducted according to rules and as a last resort in defense of national interest. This is true only up to a point. Was it according to the rules when the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or, for that matter, when it burned Tokyo from the air? Pearl Harbor was infamous enough, but the attack was not directed against civilians. In Vietnam today, we are shown pictures of Vietcong prisoners being tortured by Vietnamese government troops while American "advisers" look on. This most abominable form of violence is sanctioned because the enemy is Communist and therefore, in our lexicon, subhuman. But this is no more true than that all Americans condone torture. A U.S. sergeant has returned after twenty months in Vietcong captivity to report that he received the same food as his captors and was given medicine when they had it; his complaints boil down to forced labor, propaganda lectures, and a bamboo bed with one blanket.

Listening to the propaganda chorus, one would think that the quality of humanity belongs only to us. We say that the casualties in Vietnam are not really terrible. We compare *our* casualties there with our highway fatalities (our automobiles are built to contain a considerable element of violence), but the Vietcong casualty figures are sweet to our ears. So far in 1965, U.S. and Vietnamese pilots have killed more than 15,000 Vietcong in air strikes alone. The kill ratio during the week of the Vantuong Peninsula battle was more than 12 to 1 in our favor.

We not only love violence but the more killing we can do, at a distance and with a minimum of risk, the better we like it. The tradition of violence is embedded in American history. But anyone who thinks that the violence of technological warfare does not feed back into the civilian population must think that babies are born without insemination.

The fact we must face is that a large part of the Negro population is without occupation, without status, without hope. If in a particular place like Watts these pariahs decided that "Whitey" could be made to listen to their "manifesto" only if they attacked the police and property, they may have been misguided but they were certainly not un-American. They were simply following the American pattern as laid down in war, labor disputes, race relations in the deep South, electronic entertainment, and much else separated from the more genteel aspects of American life. The ratio of their casualties was about the same as that in Vietnam, but they did a quarter of a billion dollars' worth of property damage and scared the country. It is the property damage that has attracted attention. In that respect the "manifesto" was successful. If it is not to be repeated, we shall have to understand that once again our own violence recoiled on us. If we want peace, whether at home or abroad, we shall have to do a great deal more than meet violence with violence.

Handcuffs on Foreign Policy

When responsible citizens offer cogent criticism of our role in Vietnam or other aspects of foreign policy, they are politely brushed off or, of late, accused of betraying the men at the fighting front. In contrast, the Johnson Administration is acutely sensitive to the political blackmail exercised by minor pressure groups. These sodalities exercise a significant veto power over U.S. foreign policy which the Administration suffers without audible protest and to the disadvantage of the country. Three instances may be cited.

1. In June, 1964, Moscow approved a consular treaty with the United States which had been under negotiation since 1959. Five years had been spent in bargaining and deliberation for a modest achievement, namely, setting up the ground rules for the conduct of consular relations, in anticipation of the reopening of consulates closed down since 1948. The proposed treaty is clearly in the American interest. Some 12,000 American tourists went to the USSR last year, compared with 1,079 Russians who came here. But the Administration simply sent the treaty up to the Senate where it languished for a year until last July 30, when the Foreign Relations Committee under Senator Fulbright held hearings and on August 3 reported the measure to the Senate, with only three Republicans and two Democrats opposed. But Senator Mansfield apparently will put the matter over until next year—

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an election year in which there will be little chance of ratification by the required two-thirds vote.

Why has the Administration been so dilatory? Partly because the Liberty Lobby, a small but noisy right-wing outfit, began to bombard Senators with mail and telephone calls, but mainly because J. Edgar Hoover opposed the treaty. The President was in favor, the State Department was in favor, the Foreign Relations Committee was in favor, but Mr. Hoover was opposed, and that was that.

2. The State Department suggested to the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company the building of a synthetic rubber plant for Rumania, which is showing Titoist tendencies and ogling the West. Again Mr. Fulbright was in favor, but Young Americans for Freedom began to scream, Goodyear saw a chance to sideswipe a competitor, and the project died.

3. Again, consider this year's big Soviet wheat purchase from Canada — $450 million — bringing this year's Soviet grain purchases in the West to $600 million, but none of it from us. In the meantime, we are sitting on a 900-million-bushel wheat inventory. In 1963 we were going to sell wheat to the Russians, and President Kennedy pronounced it in the national interest. Hoping to cajole George Meany, Mr. Kennedy included a "sweetener": 50 per cent of the wheat was to be carried in American bottoms. This imposed a surcharge of some 11½c a bushel, and killed off the deal. Canada got the business. American shipping interests, longshoremen and sailors missed out entirely.

The reasons for this chronic Presidential timidity are no doubt complex, but one stands out. Perhaps the most woeful result of the cold war has been the erosion of integrity, courage and dignity among seemingly powerful American businessmen and politicians, right up to the President. As soon as there is the least danger of the accusation of softness on communism being hurled at them, they act as if they had no power at all.

The Rim of Hell

If every American could be induced to read Robert Scheer's pamphlet, "How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam" (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103, sample copy free), the outlook for the future of mankind would be considerably less gloomy. Scheer shows how easy it is for a private pressure group to hoodwink most of the people of a technologically advanced, highly literate country like the United States and to impose a tyrannical regime on a small, backward, largely illiterate country like South Vietnam. All this was and is carried on under the cloak of godliness and patriotism, and ends up with the advanced country using its superior technology to devastate the small country and its neighbor to the north.

Scheer has interviewed many of the key participants in the Vietnam tragedy, including Edward Lansdale, the CIA operative and Air Force major general who is now taking a second try at persuading the Vietnamese peasantry that though Uncle Sam comes laden with napalm and high explosives, their welfare is close to his heart. The activities of William C. Bullitt, Cardinal Spellman, Joseph P. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, Leo Cherne and a host of others are documented. Wesley Fishel, a young professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, was the first to promote Ngo Dinh Diem as the man to overturn the Geneva Agreements between the Viet Minh and the French on behalf of the Americans. He was joined by many liberals and ex-liberals. Justice William O. Douglas introduced Diem to Senators Mike Mansfield and John F. Kennedy, who were likewise impressed with his qualifications. Leo Cherne, active in the cold war as president of the International Rescue Committee, sent Joseph Buttinger, a former leader of the Social Democratic party in Austria, to set up a refugee office in South Vietnam. Lansdale introduced Buttinger to the Diem entourage in Saigon. President Eisenhower was reluctant to involve the United States deeply, but Sen. Joe McCarthy was on his flank and Cardinal Spellman, Joseph P. Kennedy, the Luce publications and a host of other influences were brought to bear on him. Soon the crusade against the Ho Chi Minh regime and the South Vietnamese peasants was in full career, although Eisenhower conceded that 80 per cent of the South Vietnamese would have voted for union with North Vietnam had the United States and Diem allowed the election agreed upon at Geneva to be held.

A bizarre item in the subsequent hostilities is the role of Michigan State University as a cover for the CIA and in the organization of a South Vietnamese government. Fishel had left UCLA for MSU, which thereupon became a power in both South Vietnamese and American politics. Fishel asserts that for months he was the only effective contact between Ambassador Lawton Collins and Diem. After two years Fishel "surfaced," in CIA terminology, and became head of the MSU program in Vietnam, which employed fifty-four professors and 200 Vietnamese assistants to organize a South Vietnamese FBI and perform other services for the freedom-loving people. The head of the MSU School of Police Administration trained Diem's palace guard, which was supplied with guns and ammunition from the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group. "Interviews with some members of the project," Scheer writes, "revealed that involvement in a high priority program gave them a heady feeling of glamour and prestige." And good jobs.

Diem received a tremendous build-up in the United States as the savior of Vietnam, but since his only domestic support came from his co-religionists and the mandarinate, he was finally thrown aside and assassinated. The subsequent series of pseudo-governments is recent history. The late Dr. Tom Dooley, whose role in these events has been celebrated in book and movie, unknowingly summed it up when he called the 17th Parallel "the rim of Hell," with "the demons of Communism stalking outside and holding the upper half of their country in their strangling grip." Hell now blankets both North and South Vietnam, and the end is not in sight.

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Engineering Misdirected

Strong support for Seymour Melman's complaints about the misuse and exhaustion of national resources by the cold War (*Our Depleted Society*) may be found in an article by Dr. J. R. Pierce, of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, in the July 23 issue of *Science*. It is Dr. Pierce's contention that by the use of government funds we are alienating engineering education from the civilian economy.

Of the 20-odd billions going annually into research and development, two-thirds or more is supported by the federal government, and this huge expenditure is largely channeled into things like nuclear submarines, combat aircraft, radar and guidance, missiles, atomic explosives, and space travel. Of these outlays Pierce heartily approves, but what worries him is the effects on engineering education. Engineering research at educational institutions is supported by the government with an equally lopsided proportion. About 80 per cent of all such support comes from the government, and over 80 per cent of that originates in the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The rest is accounted for in driblets, of which the only sizable ones come from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the National Science Foundation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Only in chemical engineering does major support of research and development flow from other than governmental sources.

What effect does this funding have on the students and the profession? "Undergraduate engineering education," Pierce writes, "is a reflection of the ideas and attitudes of leaders in engineering education. These are men who have been leaders in university research and teaching. Their attitudes reflect the research they have done." Nowadays that research is predominantly centered in "mission-oriented" defense and space subjects. This bias, continually fed with federal money, filters down to the students, graduate and undergraduate alike, who are the future members of the profession.

Those graduates who go into industry are no longer content with the traditional responsibility of the engineer, which is to invent and design industrial equipment and consumer products inexpensive and efficient enough to find a market. Most of the highly talented graduates flock with their mission-oriented Ph.D. theses into glamorous and well-paying jobs in defense and the aerospace industry, while those who stay at the universities, with the same preoccupations and conditioning, prepare to raise another generation of engineers in their own image. In turn, these engineers will create a new technology as divorced from human needs as the present one.

The top leaders of engineering education—men on a par with the intellectual leaders in the law, medicine and other professions—are by no means oblivious to all this but, says Pierce, "they have been subjected to inexorable financial forces, and these forces have established a pattern which makes it difficult for the educators to follow the dictates of their own wisdom." At this rate, there will soon be little wisdom to draw on.

Addendum to 'WHY VIETNAM?'

A Basis for Negotiation Exists . . . John Gittings

London

Speaking on July 28, President Johnson told his news conference that "Hanoi has set forth its own proposal. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected. . . ." This was in fact the first official recognition by the President or any of his spokesmen that the North Vietnamese Four Point Proposal for negotiations was even worth discussing—although it had been put forward by Premier Pham Van Dong as early as April 8. It had previously been given scant attention. Speaking at a teach-in at Oxford University on June 16, the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, had followed the American line in dismissing Hanoi's proposal as totally unacceptable, since it required that Americans should leave at once and that Communists and Communists alone should determine the future of Vietnam.

This is an inaccurate interpretation of the Four Point Proposal (which I shall detail later), as President Johnson presumably now recognizes. Failure to examine these proposals in detail has led to the belief that Hanoi is opposed to any kind of negotiations, except on the unrealistic precondition of prior American withdrawal from Vietnam. But what is really at issue is not the *willingness* to negotiate—both sides have said that they will—but the *basis* on which Hanoi is prepared to negotiate. A corollary to this lack of analysis of the Hanoi position is the widespread belief that the "Communist side," as Michael Stewart used the term at Oxford—North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front (NLF), China, and even the Soviet Union—is united in its attitude toward negotiations. The truth is that major differences exist between the Soviet Union and China on this question; even between the NLF and Hanoi there are noticeable variations in nuance.

Considerable efforts have been made to present the Soviet Union as being unwilling to shoulder its responsibilities as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam. These efforts have been particularly noticeable at

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the Foreign Office in London, where the British Government itself has been under pressure to assume those responsibilities as the second co-chairman, and to dissociate itself from American policy. But the record gives a very different picture.

It was in August, 1964, at the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident, that the Soviet Government under Mr. Khrushchev virtually washed its hands of Vietnam, and indicated as much to the then British Foreign Secretary Mr. Butler. But the new Soviet administration, headed by Mr. Kosygin, saw the dangers of this stand-off policy, both because it gave China a free hand in Southeast Asia and because it encouraged the United States to think that it could safely escalate the war in Vietnam. In November, 1964, Kosygin pledged Soviet support for Hanoi if the war was extended from the South, and on February 6, 1965—the day before such extension took place—he arrived in person in Hanoi at the invitation of the North Vietnamese Government.

The following day, speaking before a mass rally in Hanoi, Kosygin publicly proposed that the Geneva Conference should be reconvened. He said that the Soviet Union "supports the resolution of the conference of nonaligned countries in Cairo on the convocation of a new international conference on Indo-China with a view to the peaceful settlement of the questions which have arisen there."

According to private information, the same proposal had already been made on February 6 by the Soviet Ambassador in Peking to Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, and on February 7 by the Ambassador to France in Paris.

This new initiative was overshadowed by the Vietcong attack on Pleiku and the instant American "retaliation" of the same day. British and American officials took no notice of Kosygin's remarks. In the official view of the British Foreign Office, "suggestions that a new Geneva conference should be convened are regarded as premature," there was "no purpose" in reconvening such a conference, nor was there "any enthusiasm" for cooperation with the Soviet Union (*The Times* and *The Guardian,* February 9, 1965).

Meanwhile, the French Foreign Minister, M. Peyrefitte, called on the Soviet Union and Great Britain to take the necessary steps to restart talks, and twice in the following week the Soviet Union was reported to have informed Britain that it wished to promote negotiations and to resume the co-chairmanship. But Britain supported, without reservation, the American view that negotiations could not take place unless—as Mr. Stewart put it—"the Vietcong should cease their activities," thus demanding what amounted to a unilateral cease-fire by the Vietcong. The French proposal met with an unenthusiastic reception in London. On February 20, Britain proposed to the Soviet Union a form of words to be circulated to the Geneva powers asking their views on the situation, but reportedly emphasized that "it would do nothing without the closest consultation with the United States."

In view of Britain's unquestioning alignment with the United States, the Soviet Union appears to have regarded Paris rather than London as the most fertile ground for discussions. On February 23, following talks between President de Gaulle and Mr. Vinogradov, it was made known that Russia and France had agreed to seek an international conference on Vietnam. It has been argued that their motives were disingenuous — that Russia simply wanted to embarrass the West, and that France was motivated by plain anti-Americanism. Yet it cannot be denied that France has consistently advocated negotiations since September, 1963, and that the Soviet Union was sticking its neck out—and inviting Chinese criticism — by its advocacy of a peaceful solution even after the bombing of the North had commenced. "It has become clear," wrote the diplomatic correspondent of the London *Guardian* on February 25, "that the Soviet Union has been taking the initiative over the calling of an international conference on Indo-China."

But it soon became apparent that the Soviet initiative had shot its bolt for a variety of reasons. Chief among these were the lack of British cooperation and the intensification of American bombing, which stiffened the resolve of both Hanoi and the NLF not to negotiate under duress. Their reluctance was made clear at the Indo-Chinese People's Conference, held in Cambodia, March 1-9, and attended by all the neutralist or Communist governments and parties of Indo-China. There a Cambodian proposal for a new conference on Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union and supported by the nonaligned nations, was firmly rejected by Hanoi and the NLF.

Since then the Soviet Union has apparently refrained from further initiatives, although as late as June a Chinese statement accused Moscow of "trying to bring about peace negotiations, in a painstaking effort to find a way out for the U.S. aggressors," which suggests continued activity behind the scenes. Kosygin seemingly realizes that the decisions can only be taken in Vietnam and Washington, not in Moscow. Visiting London in late March, Gromyko again expressed willingness to act jointly with Britain as co-chairman, but expressed the pessimistic belief that the calling of a conference was a matter for the countries principally involved — North Vietnam and the United States. Three months later the same sense of impotence was reflected in Moscow's reply to the suggested "Commonwealth Mission." The Soviet Union, it said, was not "authorized" to enter into any discussions with regard to Vietnam.

One related initiative—for a conference on Cambodia, proposed by the Soviet Union on April 3—had also come unstuck. This was due partly to British delay in acting upon the proposal, and the clumsy admission by Gordon Walker on his mission to Southeast Asia that the conference would provide a backdoor approach to negotiations in Vietnam. This in turn aroused North Vietnamese suspicions and led to Cambodia's own rejection of the proposal.

At various times since 1962, North Vietnam and the NLF have expressed willingness to negotiate on the "neutralization" of South Vietnam. In effect, they were prepared to offer the U.S. a "way out," by which South Vietnam would be neutralized but would remain independent of the North for a period of time, although in the long run reunification would take place. In November, 1964, for instance, senior officials of the NLF told British reporter Dennis Bloodworth that they now accepted "a broad, largely non-Communist coalition government [which would] mean that

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South Vietnam would remain a separate state for several years to come." Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam told a British M.P., William Warbey, at the beginning of this year, as reported by *The Guardian*, February 9:

> *We have no desire to rush political re-unification. We want the opening up of trade and communications between the North and South and the reunion of the divided families, but political re-unification will result from a slow process of rapprochement between our Government and the new democratic Government in Saigon. This is a matter we shall settle between ourselves, in our time, and without outside interference.*

This relatively cautious and long-term approach is written into the manifesto of the NLF, which calls for the institution of a "largely liberal and democratic regime" and the election of a "new National Assembly through universal suffrage" (Article 2); for the "peaceful reunification by stages on the basis of negotiations," and the restoration of "commercial and cultural exchanges between the two zones" (Article 9). It reveals a sense of sober realism at the difficulties which any process of reunification is bound to encounter. Even following the bombing of North Vietnam, this long-term view of reunification has been reaffirmed by leaders of the NLF in, for example, the well-known interview of its Secretary-General, Huynh Tan Phat, with the French journalist Georges Chaffard (*L'Express*, April 25). There seems little doubt that if reunification ever did take place, it would do so along these lines, and that it would not assume the form of a simple North Vietnamese "take-over" of the South. It is believed that sections of the NLF itself would resist any attempt at annexation of the South by Hanoi.

But the question now is whether Hanoi and/or the NLF believe any longer that negotiation is a viable method of attaining their objective. The immediate effect of the bombing of the North was to stiffen the resolve of both, and to make them unwilling even to talk of negotiations. It was not until April 10 that the North Vietnamese National Assembly put forward what could be regarded as a realistic offer of negotiations—the Four Point Proposal which has been reiterated at regular intervals since then. This proposal enumerates the following four points, which it regards as the only proper basis for a political settlement: (*1*) . . . the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel. . . . (2) Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements must be strictly respected; the two zones must refrain from joining in any military alliances with foreign countries. . . . (3) The internal affairs must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam NLF, without any foreign interference. (4) The peaceful reunification is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

"If this basis is recognized," the proposal concludes, "favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam." In plain language, what does this mean? The essential points in the North Vietnamese position, as outlined in this proposal and in subsequent statements, are as follows:

- The eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam has to be *recognized* as the basis of a settlement; it does not have to be *carried out* before negotiations can begin. It has been made quite clear that the method of withdrawal is negotiable, but that the principle must be accepted in advance. For example, in an article by General Nguyen Van Vinh, broadcast by Hanoi radio on July 26, it was stated that:

  > *For a political solution, and to achieve true peace in South Vietnam, the U. S. imperialists must first of all agree to the withdrawal of their forces. Concerning the way of conducting this withdrawal, the imperialist side has many experiences: the French have withdrawn from Indo-China and Algeria, and the Americans have withdrawn from Laos and other areas in the world.*

- Hanoi will not accept any negotiated settlement which perpetuates the division of Vietnam, or otherwise seeks to dilute the full force of the Geneva Agreements. The purpose of negotiations is simply to insure that those agreements are fully carried out. North Vietnam has repeatedly pledged its support for the agreements, and the NLF



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American Peace Offensive

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wishes to see them implemented "in accordance with the spirit and letter of an international agreement of full legality" (statement of March 22). They presumably continue to accept the authority of the International Control Commission in any settlement, although this remains to be clarified.

Hanoi's precondition for negotiations is that the United States should publicly "recognize" that the object of such negotiations should be the implementation of the Geneva Agreements, restoring the territorial integrity and unity of Vietnam. The United States is also required to "recognize" that the NLF program is the right way to set about political reform in South Vietnam. What is then negotiable, it is implied, is the way and the pace and the guarantees by and with which reunification will be carried out.

It can be argued that this is a totally unacceptable proposal. Nevertheless, from Hanoi's point of view, the United States has already moved a long way toward it and could move even further. In February, Johnson would only negotiate after prior withdrawal by the Vietcong; in April, only with Hanoi and for the sole purpose of securing an "independent South Vietnam"; by June-July, at least some lip service was paid in Washington to the principle of reunification, and to the NLF's right to participate in negotiations. The longer we hang on, the argument in Hanoi might run, the further Johnson will move toward the realization that the only face-saving way out for America is to beat a decent retreat through negotiations which will lead to reunification and total American withdrawal. As the article quoted above suggested by way of sweetening the pill:

> *The Americans also want to know what they will obtain in return for this withdrawal. Certainly, they will get something. They will, in return, obtain peace, friendship, honor for the U.S.A., and benefit for the American people's interests and lives.*

But does the NLF see eye to eye with Hanoi on the question of negotiations? Its five-point stand as set out in the March 22 statement differs from Hanoi's Four Point Proposal in three respects: (1) It lays greater stress on the role of the NLF as the "only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people." (2) It employs more hostile and belligerent language. (3) It appears to make the actual physical withdrawal of the U.S. from South Vietnam a precondition for negotiations—a demand so unrealistic as to amount, in effect, to a rejection of negotiations.

This is another of those occasions where the NLF speaks with a voice different from that of Hanoi. Even if the difference is not particularly marked, it should give food for thought to those who believe that the NLF is merely a Hanoi puppet. It is partly explicable by the simple fact that those who actually engaged in the field — i.e., the Vietcong—have even less reason to take American offers of negotiations seriously, and are reluctant to weaken morale among their own supporters by making the slightest conciliatory gesture. In addition, there have been occasional hints of a certain amount of disillusion within the NLF toward Hanoi. Some NLF leaders may well feel that negotiations would give North Vietnam a greater say in the future of the South than they themselves could win on the battlefield. Most important of all, until the NLF is recognized in its own right as a major participant in any negotiations, it obviously will not reveal its hand publicly.

In private, as usual, the NLF attitude is slightly more conciliatory. On the major point of American withdrawal, its president, Nguyen Huu Tho, told one journalist that "withdrawal of all American troops with all their arms and equipment" need only be the "basis of any eventual agreement" (*Sunday Times*, June 27). Both he and the Secretary-General, Huynh Tan Phat (in his interview with Georges Chaffard), have defined the kind of negotiations which they would accept. Such negotiations should be primarily an internal affair *among all the Vietnamese parties*. The role of the foreign powers should be limited to making proposals, ratifying the agreements reached, and providing guarantees for their execution. What the NLF rejects absolutely is the idea that any foreign power should have a decisive say in the internal affairs of Vietnam.

The attitude of the Chinese toward negotiations accords more closely with that of the NLF than of North Vietnam. Prior U.S. withdrawal is an absolute precondition, all offers of mediation are imperialist or revisionist hoaxes, etc. This strong propaganda line is reinforced by three considerations: First, there is the genuine belief, based on the Chinese Communist party's own revolutionary experience, that a people's war can be won against superior odds, and that offers of negotiation are meaningless. Second, the fact that the Soviet Union is in favor of negotiations in itself compels the Chinese, in their present implacable mood toward "modern revisionism," to be against. Third, China regards Vietnam as a test case in the struggle against American imperialism (just as America believes the reverse). Opposition to American aggression in Vietnam is the "spearhead" of a world-wide frontal attack on the enemy, and no weakness must be shown.

But as in the case of the NLF, the real Chinese position is undoubtedly more complex, and is explained unofficially in terms which could be paraphrased in the following way: In the present tense situation, decisions must be left entirely to the people on the spot — the Vietcong. Even if they are making mistakes, we must be scrupulously careful not to diverge publicly from them—unlike the Soviet Union, which has blatantly weakened solidarity with the Vietcong by its so-called "peace initiatives."

But we Chinese reserve our position on negotiations; we don't reject them out of hand if circumstances change. For instance, we have not yet given a reply—affirmative or negative — to the Soviet proposal of last February. On the question of American withdrawal, we would refer you to Chairman Mao's interview with Edgar Snow early this year, in which the Chairman said that U.S. withdrawal *after* a conference was one of several possibilities. [Interview published by the *Sunday Times*, February 14.] If a conference does eventually take place with the full participation and concurrence of the NLF, of course we shall be there. But it is up to them to decide.

To conclude, "the Communist side" does not present a totally united front on the desirability of negotiations. This is the first myth which needs to be exploded among a major part of Western political and press opinion. Further, Hanoi is on open record as accepting the

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principle of a negotiated solution—China and the NLF accept it but with more ambiguity. What is at issue is not whether negotiations should take place but what the *basis* of such negotiations should be. Here lies the crux of the difference between America on the one hand and North Vietnam and the NLF on the other. The latter will negotiate only on ways and means of implementing the 1954 Geneva Agreements, and would prefer to fight on rather than accept any dilution of those agreements. America, however, has refused to endorse them from 1954 until very recently. The Vietnamese suspect that despite recent statements, America's policy has not undergone any genuine change, and that talk of "reunification" and "respecting the Geneva Agreements" by Mr. Rusk is outweighed by talk of "maintaining an independent South Vietnam" by Mr. McNamara. It will take a lot to convince them otherwise. From their point of view, they accepted one compromise solution in negotiations at Geneva in 1954, and were subsequently let down; they will not accept another compromise. As the North Vietnamese delegation to the Helsinki Peace Congress argued at a meeting with the British contingent (*Peace News*, August 13):

On the question of negotiations, we think we already have negotiated and have the basis for the solution of the problem. The Geneva Agreements recognize the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam. It was not easy to get these agreements—they took a lot of negotiating. Now it is said we should negotiate again. For what? Shall we negotiate for a solution where Vietnam is not independent and not unified? No. Nor shall we negotiate for the perpetuation of division of our country.

Like almost every other facet of the Vietnam situation since 1954, the problem of negotiations can be reduced to the following question: Do we accept the reunification of Vietnam on the terms of the Geneva Agreements? If the answer is no, then it is futile even to offer negotiations to Hanoi and the NLF, and there is little alternative but to fight on. If the answer is yes, then in effect we have accepted their "basis" for negotiation. However much Western liberal opinion may dislike it, there is no middle way between these two choices.

The Shadow Presidency . . . James MacGregor Burns

People were freely predicting at the time of Lyndon Johnson's inaugural in January, 1965, that the nation was headed for a modern era of good feelings. The President himself had said after his election that the country had reached a new "consensus on national purpose and policy." He was quite right—the nation had indeed reached a consensus over the goals of freedom and equality. But these are not the only problems that occupy men, and history warned that eras of apparent good feelings could conceal heats and ferments that would erupt in turbulence and strife years later.

And an unblinking look at the world and the nation in the mid-sixties discloses a profusion of interlaced problems, any one cluster of which could occupy a people's energies: at home the problems of rapidly changing group and class and generational relationships, education, urban disorder, mounting crime rates, social anomie and alienation, automation, political apathy, along with the more old-fashioned issues such as transportation, farm subsidies, labor-management relations, tax reform, monopoly and administered prices, medical care; and abroad, nuclear proliferation, the continuing and in many areas deepening poverty of tens of millions, the population explosion, the disruption of old rural cultures and the flood of people into the restless cities, the fragmentization of Africa, the social unrest of Latin America, Communist expansion in Asia, along with the week-to-week "little" crises, any one of which could explode into a major one.

It is impossible in the mid-sixties to predict in what forms these problems will emerge with the passage of time. One might speculate, though, that many of the most crucial domestic problems will revolve around certain old but still compelling value questions. Given the trends in the nation that one can predict with the greatest certainty—huge population increases in the urban and suburban areas, accelerated social mobility, a constantly enlarging and increasingly homogenized middle-class population, a decline in ethnic solidarity and variety—one might guess that once the old problems of equality and freedom have been subdued, sharper questions will emerge over the possibilities of individuality and privacy in a mass culture. If the past century has seen the early tension and later partial reconciliation of values of liberty and equality, we may be at the threshold of an age increasingly preoccupied with the relation of liberty and fraternity, of privacy and community, of the individual and the group. If in past years we have been concerned with mainly quantitative problems—the amount of goods and services produced and how they were distributed—we may be more occupied in the future with the quality of American life in a great, affluent, complacent, and perhaps mediocre society.

The quality of American life—this is not a new phrase nor a new political issue. It is older than Jefferson's dreams and as young as the Great Society. No one has defined the hope and the promise better than President Johnson. In May of 1964 he proclaimed at the University of Michigan:

The Great Society is a place where

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every child can find knowledge to enrich his mind and enlarge his talents. It is a place where leisure is a welcome chance to build and reflect, not a feared cause of boredom and restlessness. It is a place where the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community.

It is a place where man can renew contact with nature. It is a place which honors creation for its own sake and for what it adds to the understanding of the race. It is a place where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods. But most of all, the Great Society is not a safe harbor, a resting place, a final objective, a finished work. It is a challenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward a destiny where the meaning of our lives matches the marvelous products of our labor.

The crux of the problem is whether a system of Presidential government so perfectly adapted to, and so largely facilitative of, quantitative liberalism—that is, of the augmentation and fairer distribution of goods—can redefine its purpose and shift its strategy in order to embrace new values with their implications for changes in means and instrumental goals. Such a shift calls for much more than making the White House into a show place of the arts, or awarding medals to heroes of culture, or bestowing Presidential recognition on private cultural enterprises. It means a concerted and sustained and expensive effort to impart values like those of Johnson to the barren lives of millions of Americans, middle class as well as deprived. It means diverting the kind of resources into cultural, recreational and educational activities that we have in the past poured into economic recovery, or even into national defense. And such an effort might be controversial and even unpopular. Many Americans would oppose it and deride it; by its very nature such an effort would bring foolish blunders and mishaps that could be easily caricatured; and certain ventures—perhaps an effort to improve the quality of commercial radio and television—could precipitate clashes with powerful interests.

Above all, the shift from the pursuit of quantitative to qualitative goals would call for comprehensive, sustained and broadly unified policies—in short, for planning. Effective planning is impossible except in the context of at least a rough ordering of values, instrumental goals and means. It will be as important to have clearly thought out, long-range priorities in this respect as it would be in planning increased productivity. Winston Churchill once said that "those who are possessed of a definite body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and indulging their natural impulses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day." Considering the intractable nature of the many human problems implicit in the quest for a qualitatively great society, Churchill's remarks are as relevant to a cultural strategy as to a foreign or economic.

Presidential government is a superb planning institution. The President has the attention of the country, the administrative tools, the command of information, and the fiscal resources that are necessary for intelligent planning, and he is gaining the institutional power that will make such planning operational. Better than any other human instrumentality he can order the relations of his ends and means, alter existing institutions and procedures or create new ones, calculate the consequences of different policies, experiment with various methods, control the timing of action, anticipate the reactions of affected interests, and conciliate them or at least mediate among them. If, as Hubert Humphrey has said, we need not a planned society but a continuously planning society, the Presidency provides strong and versatile tools for that purpose.

Still, we must acknowledge that the Presidency has become an effective planning agency for reasons of chance as well as volition. In this century the Presidency has been the center of the conflict between labor and capital and later between segregationists and civil rights forces; it has steeled its will and its ideology in the struggles against Nazi tyranny and Communist expansion. After a century of planless growth the Presidency found its place as a key part of the American system of ends and means. The question is whether Presidential government can detach itself enough from set ideas and existing institutions and old ways to embrace new goals. With leadership, to quote Philip Selznick, "the problem is always *to choose key values and to create a social structure that embodies them.* The task of building values into social structure is not necessarily consistent, especially in early stages, with rules of administration based on economic premises. Only after key choices have been made and related policies firmly established can criteria of efficient administration play a significant role. Even then, the smooth-running machine must accept disturbance when critical problems of adaptation and change arise."

To define new goals, to fashion new institutions to realize those goals, to avoid both utopianism and opportunism, to build popular support without improper manipulation, to allow for flexibility of means and redefinition of ends, and always to elevate purpose over technique—all this is the test of creative leadership. It will be the test of Presidential government in the years ahead. To define leadership in this way is to see the importance of a number of proposals that have been made to strengthen the Presidency and hence to enable the President to reshape institutions and processes: four-year terms for Representatives (to bring Presidential and Congressional constituencies into closer correspondence); the granting of full power to the President to control executive department organization; finding means of attracting the highest talent to the executive department, especially to its major staff positions; efforts to bring into the policy-making process intellectuals with creative and innovative gifts; providing the President with greater discretionary power over fiscal policy, including the item veto and the granting of authority to change tax rates within certain limits; and above all, the further strengthening of the elected leadership of Congress so that it can act more quickly and comprehensively in harmony with the President. But the greatest need of Presidential government does not lie in this kind of reform. We can expect many of these changes to take place in any event as the Presidency becomes increasingly institutionalized. Indeed, some are already taking place, in substance if not in form. Some of them at best will simply speed up transitions that already are under way—for example, greater Presi-

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dential control over fiscal policy.

The greatest need of the Presidency in the years to come will be an opposition that challenges Presidential values, Presidential methods, Presidential institutions, that is eager to take power and to present its own definition of the national purpose.

Of all the vital elements of American democratic government the national opposition is the most disorganized, fragmented and ineffective. As a responsible opposition to the President, Congress is an almost total failure. Hostile Senators and Representatives bombard the White House from all directions. Typically they fail to advance alternative proposals and hence they do not provide the voters with an idea as to how the opposition would govern if it got the chance. The Congressmen usually prefer to play the game of bargain and even resort to various forms of genteel blackmail with the President rather than criticize forthrightly and dramatically. No wonder that Presidents in recent years have been far more sensitive to criticism in the press than on Capitol Hill.

Good reasons exist for the debility of the opposition. In part it is a simple reflection of the power of Presidential government. "The aggrandizement of the President, especially by the electronic media," as V. O. Key, Jr., has said, "has made the dispersed minority leadership one of low public visibility." The main difficulty is the bifurcation of the opposition into the Presidential and Congressional parties. Once the Presidential candidate—the Presidential party's leader—has made his strenuous campaign and lost, he then becomes "titular" leader of the whole party. This is a polite term for being shelved or even repudiated. For once the campaign is lost, the Congressional party leaders try to assume the opposition role. They hold formal and visible positions from which to conduct the attack, while the titular leader usually has no formal position to fall back on, as in the cases of Stevenson in 1956, Nixon in 1960 and Goldwater in 1964. But the Congressional party cannot carry the burden of militant leadership, because of its own internal divisions, its separation between the House and the Senate, and its lack of institutional structure (as compared with the Shadow Cabinet in Great Britain). If the opposition party has lost the Presidency but still controls one or both branches of Congress, as in the case of the Democrats after 1956, it lacks the advantage of being completely in the opposition; it suffers from having a modicum of power and responsibility. If the opposition party lacks control of Congress as well as of the White House, it has a poor forum from which to appeal to the public and virtually no machinery to support a focused and sustained attack on the government.



Schwering

The opposition's impotence becomes more serious as Presidential government becomes more powerful. No matter how benign a government may be, it will be tempted to manipulate public opinion, to try to dominate the flow of opinion, to cover up mistakes, and to cast doubt on the patriotism or at least the honesty of outside critics. The more that government represents a consensus, or claims to, the more tempted it may be to succumb to some of these tendencies. Above all a consensus government may become flabby and complacent and lose the cutting edge of energy, initiative and innovation. The very tendencies toward excessive concern with technique that we noted above can cause a government to lose direction and momentum unless the opposition holds it to its promises and threatens to oust it from power.

The problem is especially acute in the United States because of the lack of well-organized and programmatic parties. This is less of a problem for the President because, as we have seen, he has built up his own Presidential party to provide him with an electoral footing and other political resources. The opposition Presidential party, lacking a President and having to make do with a titular leader, is not anchored in an organized mass following and a militant cadre. It must improvise—and that in turn encourages a similar opportunism and absence of direction in the Presidential establishment.

Another great need of the American Presidency is a potent and competitive shadow Presidency. At the very least the opposition party should establish some kind of collective leadership, modeled perhaps after the Democratic Advisory Council of the 1950s, to give the Presidential party a strong voice. More than this, it should experiment with an annual or biennial convention or conference both to choose a top leader and to renovate its program. The failure of the opposition to take this primitive step is not due to any innate difficulty but mainly to the divergent constituencies and institutional jealousies of the Congressional party, which wants to dominate the opposition role even though it fills that role so feebly. Ideally there would be an annual convention, a dependable system for collecting adequate funds, a large national staff with regional and state units under it, an effective propaganda apparatus, and talented, articulate and highly visible leadership. Whatever the exact form, it is clear that the opposition party today has a rare opportunity to exercise Jeffersonian leadership — that is, to build a new political institution.

Even more important, the oppo-

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sition party must display creative leadership in defining its own version of the national purpose. It is not for outsiders to lecture the opposition party as to the goals it might propose, but one must note the great opportunity that may lie before it. If Presidential government as shaped by liberals for egalitarian purposes cannot shift its own strategy toward qualitative goals, if Presidential government under Democratic Party leadership may be hobbled by its own successes, then the opposition could seize the initiative. American conservatives have long been interested in the now intensifying problems of individuality and community, identity and alienation, liberty and fraternity, innovation and tradition, equality and hierarchy. As Clinton Rossiter has argued, they have not blinked at the hard questions about man in society. And it was under Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt, both Republicans, that the nation first addressed itself most directly to problems of the quality of American life. In executing one of the oldest of political and military strategies —shifting the grounds of the combat—modern conservatives can come to grips with liberal democracy and its Presidential establishment.

Perhaps all this is unnecessary—perhaps we can give in to the acknowledged rewards and virtues of Presidential government, without worrying much about competition, criticism, alternatives and the tasks of an opposition. But a great people will not be content long to float in such a slack tide. At the conclusion of his study of a group of working men in an Eastern city—a group that was not technically a cross section of a larger population but may be highly indicative of social trends —Robert Lane wrote: "The man of Eastport has no cathedral building in his air space to raise his sense of importance and mission; he is not engaged anywhere in a struggle against want or fear or squalor in such a way as to engage his mind and take him out of himself; he is not, like the Italian Fascists who were his uncles, rebuilding a glorious Roman history; manifest destiny, the conquering of a continent, are parts of a history not quite his own, and anyway they refer to completed tasks. What shall he do that will call out the greatness in him? Against the background of a great purpose, he might measure the political system and say whether or not it is just. But he has no way to conjure up such a vision, and hence no way to take the measure of his society."

Poland's Perennial Problem . . . Carey McWilliams

Warsaw

That age-old irritant, "the Polish Problem," which Briand called "le rheumatisme de l'Europe," seems to have been finally eliminated. The essence of the problem was that Poland had no natural borders except in the north, the Baltic, and the South, the Carpathians. Caught up for centuries in East-West, largely German-Russian, power politics, Poland's geographic position invited the partitions, risings and suppressions which were recurrent themes in its tragic prewar history. Historically the Poles sought to play one power against the other, but this seldom resulted in a policy of "neutrality"; what the Poles most often succeeded in doing was to antagonize both Germany and Russia. Poland, as John W. Wheeler-Bennett once said, was "a canary who has persistently endeavored to swallow two cats."

In this sense, "the Polish Problem" has ceased to exist—for the foreseeable future. Circumstances have aligned Poland with the Soviet Union in such a way that it would not want to be "neutral" if this were possible. It is not merely that the "recovered" or former German territories have been valuable acquisitions but that the Soviet Union has the same stake in holding the present Oder-Neisse line as do the Poles. Present-day Poland, moreover, is ethnically more homogeneous, and makes more sense geographically, than did the Poland of the inter-war period. Also, 50 per cent of the population now living in the former German territories was born there. But the main reason for feeling that "the Polish Problem" has been solved is the permanent alienation of Polish opinion which German cruelty achieved in World War II.

Nearly every Polish family has good reason to remember German inhumanity. Two generations of Poles would have to die before these memories would dim perceptibly. Today it is not so much a question of active enmity as of profound distrust. The behavior of the East Germans, ideological blood brothers, merely confirms Polish attitudes. The East Germans, who can now visit Poland on border-crossing cards, are regarded as arrogant and hypocritical. The East Germans profess, for example, a vast lack of interest in visiting concentration camp sites and memorials; their position is that they have no responsibility for what happened there and no desire to be reminded of it. Nor are the West Germans more tactful. When the Krupp interests recently proposed the construction of industrial plants in Poland on a partnership basis, the Poles made careful note of the fact that Krupp had sited the proposed plants in the former German territories.

But if World War II liquidated "the Polish Problem," it left Poland with its historic problem—peasant agriculture. As late as 1921, Poland had roughly the same percentage of its population dependent on agriculture as England had in the late 17th century — about seventy out of every 100. The value of output per farm was about half as much as in West European countries, and a huge surplus labor force was to be found in rural areas. Virtually nothing was done betwen World War I and World War II to break the dominance of peasant farming; the level of industrialization on the eve of World War II was lower than in Spain, Hungary and Italy. The need to industrialize was widely acknowledged but there were strong pressures against it. Large landholders were not favorable, and peasant political leadership in Poland as elsewhere tended to be demagogic and reactionary. Even those who sought to press industrialization did so in terms of recommendations, usually prepared by French or American advisers, that failed to consider the extent to which peasant agriculture handicapped any effort to modernize the Polish economy.

As Samuel L. Sharp has pointed

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out, pre-World War II Poland was a "capitalist" country without capital: "The poverty of the peasant masses prevented the development of an internal market for industrial goods." In 1922, the 64 per cent of the population still dependent on agriculture consumed only 47 per cent of the national income, mostly in the form of their own retained production and "only 12 per cent in the form of goods purchased on the market." France, of course, had an interest in propping up Pilsudski's Poland as a buffer state, but neither French nor West European industrialists generally were eager to further the industrialization of Poland. The little capital Poland managed to secure from the West, obtained at excessively high interest rates, was improvidently invested. In a word, prewar Poland displayed the characteristic feature of an economically underdeveloped country, namely, a striking discrepancy between available capital and existing manpower: "insufficient capital endowment for the productive and efficient use of the labor force" (Jozef Pajestka).

Restructuring such an economy is not an easy task, particularly in a war-ravaged land. It is not surprising, therefore, that special circumstances as much as ideology have dictated the form the effort has taken. Since native capital was inadequate, and foreign funds were not available, Poland had to tap what its economists call "the reserves of backwardness" — that is, unused manpower — in order to launch an investment program. In effect, its reserves of manpower had to be capitalized. One such device was to require compulsory deliveries of certain farm products at prices lower than those obtainable on the free market (this was also, of course, a device to control prices for these products). Obligatory deliveries were in addition to normal land taxes, which were graduated in relation to size of farming unit, different kinds of soils, amount of arable land, and other factors. The difference between the value of forced deliveries and the market price constituted a sizable fund which was used to press industrialization.

For the time being, the modernization of agriculture had to be deferred; industrialization offered better immediate prospects for putting large numbers of unemployed to work with the minimum delay. To this end, a policy of maximum employment was adopted based on the fullest utilization of existing industrial plants which, in the interwar years, had never been operated at full capacity. By comparison with the prewar period, employment outside of agriculture rose in the postwar period by over 4 million (in spite of lower population figures). The reconstruction of the economy from losses suffered during the war was fairly quickly achieved; by 1949, Polish industrial production surpassed the prewar level by 63 per cent. Postwar construction needs were, of course, enormous; the reconstruction of Warsaw alone took about 10 per cent of the national investment while it was under way. Here again policy stressed the importance of putting as many people to work as quickly as possible. Construction work was often carried out with the use of simple techniques and with no major supplies of equipment and machinery. The big construction program was, in turn, a factor in stimulating the demand for industrial goods and industrial investment. In industry, construction and government, certain categories of normally high wages were kept at an arbitrarily low level. The policy of maximum employment stepped up the demand for agricultural products and thereby tapped reserves of "hidden" peasant manpower on the farms. It also drew surplus farm manpower to the cities. The agricultural population declined from 60 per cent before the war to 47 per cent in 1950, then to 38 per cent in 1960. Western critics would say that such policies amounted to "sweating the capital out of the peasants and workers," but a nation without capital, faced wth an imperative need to industrialize, has got to get the capital from some source.

To carry out such drastic policies in an economy as war-ravaged and backward as Poland's was in 1945, required tight controls, notably over wage and price policies. But the extent of the debacle facilitated the imposition of these controls. In Poland today, foreign trade is rigidly controlled by the state. The entire wholesale and over 90 per cent of retail trade is handled by state firms or cooperatives. Over 93 per cent of all those working outside agriculture are employed in the nationalized sector of the economy.

Only in agriculture does private ownership of the means of production prevail, and even here the state exercises strong indirect controls. There is, as might be expected, the usual bureaucratic top-heaviness and inefficiency. The fact, too, that state socialism was imposed in Poland — that it came in the wake of wartime collapse and occupation— creates an odd impression at times, as though large sections of the population had never been directly involved in the process of social revolution. An economically underdeveloped country, particularly in the circumstances that Poland faced after the war, has great need for favorable foreign trade balances but few means of acquiring them. Polish ham is a fine product but the market is limited. Breaking into competitive West European markets is enormously difficult. Then, too, Poland has a shortage of raw materials. In fact all the East European countries face this same problem, a circumstance that minimizes inter-bloc trade and makes these countries competitors for inadequate supplies of Russian raw materials. To develop raw-material sources requires large capital expenditures and takes time. Another factor limiting inter-bloc trade is that the member states are all strongly protectionist (they have to be), so that there is not too much that they can do in the way of mutual aid, except in technological exchange and a few other fields.

The ideological blueprint for reconstruction called, of course, for the collectivization of peasant holdings. But Poland was in no position to press collectivization. The Church was one block but of greater importance was the fact that not enough alternative jobs were available to absorb the manpower that would be displaced. Peasant farmers are at least self-supporting. By deferring plans for collectivization, which the regime was forced to do, migration to the cities was slowed down while new job opportunities were being created. Nor was there much point in attempting to collectivize peasant holdings when the means to mechanize agriculture were not available, with the result that today 87 per cent of Polish agriculture is still in the private sector. State farms account for 12 per cent and cooperatives for 1 per cent. Most of the state farms are in the western or "recovered" territories; here it was easy to collectivize farms and, in this area also, farm units were

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

larger to begin with. The state farms are primarily used as experimental farms, to supply seed and breed livestock for the peasant farms. Most of the privately owned farms are very small holdings of 5 to 7 hectares; 50 hectares is the maximum for a single holding. Something like 50 per cent of the peasants live in villages. Today 78 per cent of the villages have electricity, which is also available in about 74 per cent of the isolated farmsteads. Quite a number of peasants—say 10 per cent—work part time in factories or for the government, and a large number of holdings are really no more than rural residences for urban workers.

Until about 1955, the regime used the device of compulsory deliveries as a means by which it hoped to force peasants into cooperatives or state farms. But with characteristic stubbornness, the peasant wouldn't be squeezed; he simply clamped down on production. Without increased capital investment in agriculture—which the regime was not prepared to make at the time—the only way to step up agricultural production was to relax controls. Once compulsory deliveries were cut back, those mysterious "hidden" reserves of the peasant were promptly tapped. For a period of four or five years production steadily increased, but it has now begun to taper off. The Polish planners I interviewed are convinced that if further gains are to be achieved, substantial investment funds must now be channeled into agriculture. A big nitrogen plant is being constructed, which will increase the amount of available fertilizer; Polish farms should be receiving three or four times more fertilizer than at present. Investment is needed also to develop better seed and livestock, for storage facilities and drainage projects, for pesticides, for mechanization, etc.

Initially the regime set out to stimulate agricultural production in areas which promised the largest immediate results. For example, pig production was encouraged. Polish peasants know how to raise pigs, Polish rye is excellent pig fodder, and the life cycle of the animal is short. Pig production also yielded an export item for which there was a good if limited market. But soon the Poles found themselves in a bind. Polish soils are thin and mediocre, and pig manure is not a satisfactory fertilizer. Cow manure is better, and cattle products, milk and beef, offer a better market potential. However, cattle require grain, and Poland is short of grains. In addition, Poland has more horses than the United States and horses consume grain. If Poland could afford a variety of special-purpose tractors, it might be possible to decrease the dependence on horses, but the available types are less versatile on peasant holdings than horses.

Moreover, Polish peasants have a special fondness for horses which are, in their eyes, status symbols. In cities such as Warsaw and Krakow, a familiar sight is the V-shaped shallow peasant cart, drawn by one horse, used to transport building materials, rubbish, farm produce, almost anything. The peasant, wearing a cap, squats in the V-shaped trough, flecking the horse with a whip and cursing him fondly. The horse trots along on one side of a long, often very crudely fashioned wagon pole. Uniformly the horses are well kept and exhibit the marks of good breeding; many seem to have been bred for more elegant uses than those to which they are put. Surplus American grains were a great aid to the Poles for a time but, unfortunately, Poland has little to offer us that we want or need by way of exchange for grain. Recently it has been possible to buy grains on somewhat more favorable terms from France and Mexico, but the problem remains.

The main device used to channel investment into agriculture is the Agricultural Development Fund. Previously the total value of the difference between obligatory deliveries of meat and grain was simply added to the general social accumulation. Now it is returned to the peasants, not on an individual basis but as a village investment fund which is administered, subject to firm guidelines, by the local Agriculture Circle. Such funds can be spent only for the purchase of the means of production (about 75 per cent is spent for mechanization) and peasants must pay a portion of the purchase price. The equipment, of course, is in charge of the local Agriculture Circle. Compulsory deliveries—long a bone of contention—were being gradually eliminated, but the curtailment has been checked for the time being, in an effort to increase capital investment in agriculture. Today the price difference with which the accounts of some 38,000 Polish villages are credited each year amounts to approximately 3,500 million zlotys (24 to the dollar). This is about as much as the taxes paid by farmers.

Admittedly, peasant holdings are too small to be economically efficient. But consolidation is slowly taking place by a process of "natural elimination." The son of a peasant couple goes to the city to take a factory job. For a time the couple can carry on alone but as they grow older — and eventually die — the holding is usually consolidated with some larger unit (much the same process is at work in our own Middle West). In some areas of Poland there is still a large pool of unemployed manpower in rural areas; in

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other areas there are actual manpower shortages. One of the problems is the immobility of peasant labor; ties to village and family are strong, and peasants do not like to move. With a population of around 31 million, the Poles do not have a formal population policy; population pressure is not regarded as excessive. The population profile shows certain distortions: for example, a big increase in young workers for whom jobs must be found in ever-increasing volume. If one takes into consideration families for whom agriculture is a supplementary source of income, then about 50 per cent of the population is still rural —a high percentage. But only 38 per cent are directly dependent on agriculture for a livelihood—a significant drop compared to prewar figures.

Progressive taxation is used to discourage capitalist tendencies in agriculture; the percentage of farmers formerly in the *kulak* class—those who employed permanent farm laborers—has dropped significantly. Today the rural population divides—depending on the region—into three classes: medium farmers (the real peasant-type holding), from 45 to 62 per cent; peasant laborers, from 47 to 24 per cent; and the remainder, composed of inhabitants of rural areas whose occupation is nonagricultural — old-age pensioners, part-time factory workers, et al.—from 6 to 20 per cent (*Social and Political Transformations in Poland*, edited by Dr. Stanislaw Ehrlich, Warsaw, 1964, p. 83).

Polish agricultural planners and economists are quite specific on the point that town-and-country, urban-rural relations are with them the subject of constant investigation and an ongoing, unresolved theoretical debate. With automation on the increase, it may well be that there is more of a future for the small holding, in one form or another, than might have been thought possible some years ago. Jerzy Tepicht, writing in the volume cited, puts the problem this way: "An obstacle in agricultural growth is not only—and now not even primarily—the small size of the farms but their social *peasant* character. By peasant character we mean a *universal* one (many crops and many kinds of livestock on a small farm) based on traditional means of production and *not counted* (unpaid) family labor, plus countless other ties of the family with the farm. For the time being this peasant nature of agriculture may spare us some of the trouble connected with investments and with finding employment for a portion of the rural population, but in a country undergoing the process of industrialization it is bound to produce unavoidable conflict" (p. 83, the author's emphasis). Later, in the same article, Tepicht goes on to say: "The fact that these experiments" —in the type of farm unit—"are being conducted suggests that no new model for social farms has yet been formed in People's Poland to replace the peasant farm of today. . . . It is possible that not one model, but several, may emerge."

Because Poland is the classic case of peasant-dominated agriculture, it will be extremely interesting to see how Polish policy unfolds. In Geneva, shortly before his death, Adlai Stevenson called attention to the world-wide problem caused by the rush of small farmers, and rural residents generally, into cities at a vaster rate and in larger volume than the cities can provide jobs for them. The Poles have wisely decided not to accelerate this process but to use the "reserves of backwardness" in rural areas to achieve Socialist ends. The peasant problem—preeminently Poland's problem—has clearly not been solved, but it is assuming new dimensions and it has been reduced in scale.

The Forgotten Amendment . . . James D. Carroll

In *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, the birth-control case handed down on June 7, the Supreme Court confounded most of the informed members of its public by giving everyone something and no one everything. June 7 was one of those days when it was impossible to tell the good guys on the Court from the bad. While Justices Harlan and Black in the background were decorously exchanging the mantles of judicial restraint and judicial activism, in the foreground Justices Douglas and Goldberg were excitedly announcing the discovery of a general constitutional right to marital privacy and the rediscovery of the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution.

The Court's decision was clear and simple: seven members agreed that the Connecticut statute prohibiting the dissemination and use of birth-control information and devices is unconstitutional. The grounds on which the decision was reached were not so simple: the statute violates a right to marital privacy that is fundamental to our civilization and our way of life. To explain their reasoning, the seven members of the Court who agreed with the decision produced four opinions. The dissenting Justices Black and Stewart produced two. June 7 was a good day for those who like to read Supreme Court opinions.

It is evident that the appellants, Estelle T. Griswold and Dr. Charles Lee Buxton, had got what they wanted. The Planned Parenthood League's birth-control clinic in New Haven can now legally disseminate birth-control information and devices. The citizens of Connecticut can now practice birth control in peace. But the appellants paid for this victory, if not out of their own intellectual pockets, then out of the intellectual pockets of those who believe that some form of compulsory birth control will be necessary in the future. The price they paid was the Court's recognition of marital privacy as a right that transcends the social interests of the state. Three of the Court's liberals, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Goldberg and Justice Brennan, went far out of their way to state flatly that a law requiring compulsory birth control would be just as unconstitutional as the Connecticut law outlawing voluntary birth control, since both laws would violate the right of marital privacy. This observation was a dictum, of course, but it was no idle or academic dictum, nor was it a sop

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tossed to the beggars who wanted the Connecticut law upheld.

These Justices expressed an acute awareness that many people in the United States and elsewhere are convinced that some form of compulsory birth control is inevitable. For example, Kenneth Boulding, who is widely and I think rightly respected as a thinker of prescience and insight, recently outlined the world's population problem and explained his response to it: "I think in all seriousness," Boulding wrote in *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*, "that a system of marketable licenses to have children is the only one which will combine the minimum of social control necessary to the solution to this problem with a maximum of individual liberty and ethical choice." Boulding's plan may seem absurd at the moment, but who fifty years ago could foresee that in the 1960s the Catholic Church would re-examine its stand on artificial birth control?

The grounds of the Court's decision should satisfy many citizens who wanted the Court to leave the Connecticut statute alone. Even those who think the Court should quit playing the role of interpreter of the American conscience should be pleased with the majority's affirmation of a right to marital privacy and with the clear suggestion that the majority will recognize other forms of a general right to privacy in the future.

Prior to the birth-control decision, a right to privacy had to be tagged on to one of the specific rights affirmed in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendments. If the action of a state were involved, the right had to be arrived at through interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A central issue in the case was this: Is there a constitutional right to privacy that applies to both state and federal action involving relationships not enumerated in the Constitution?

The majority of the Court held yes. The majority flatly stated that a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" against state and federal action exists, a zone not limited to the exact relationships specified in specific constitutional provisions. In cases of state action, this zone of privacy is guaranteed both by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Ninth Amendment. In cases of federal action it is guaranteed by the entire Bill of Rights.

The boundaries of the zone of privacy will have to be defined in future cases. Those who regard the invasion of the individual's privacy through the collectivization of man as one of the great threats of our time may come to regard the Griswold case as the Magna Charta of the 20th century. In more modest terms, they may derive immediate solace from Justice Douglas' concluding words of the Court's opinion:

> *We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. The association promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.*

To the student of constitutional history, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the birth-control case is the Court's recognition of the Ninth Amendment as a mechanism for the expression of "the collective conscience of our people" against both federal and state action. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The recognition at this time of the Ninth Amendment as a substantive limitation on state and federal action is truly an astounding development. As Bennett B. Patterson pointed out ten years ago in the *Forgotten Ninth Amendment*, the Supreme Court throughout its entire history has almost completely ignored the Ninth Amendment.

As far as I can determine from a recent check of Supreme Court cases, the Court never in its entire history has decided a single case on the basis of the Ninth Amendment. It has discussed the Ninth Amendment in half a dozen cases. In one of these, *United Public Workers* v. *Mitchell*, it used the Ninth Amendment to support a decision arrived at on other grounds. Throughout most of its history, the Court has apparently accepted the traditional understanding of the amendment expressed by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in the birth-control case. Justice Stewart argued that the Ninth Amendment was adopted merely to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that the federal government is a government of express and limited powers. "Until today, no member of this Court has ever suggested that the Ninth Amendment meant anything else. . . ."

Justice Goldberg expressed the new meaning of the Ninth Amendment in his concurring opinion. He argued that the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the framers of the Constitution believed that other fundamental rights which are protected against government infringement exist alongside the rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment recognizes that these fundamental personal rights, such as the right to marital privacy, are protected from abridgment by government though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. The courts must look to the "collective conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is so rooted there as to be ranked as fundamental.

The recognition by the Court of the Ninth Amendment is of fundamental importance as an affirmation of the Court's intention to protect the sovereignty and dignity of the individual. In a way, this recognition constitutes the declaration of a new Bill of Rights for the 20th century, for as Patterson said in his prophetic book:

> *There is no clause in the Constitution, except the Ninth Amendment, which makes a declaration of the sovereignty and dignity of the individual.*
>
> *Since individual freedom is the basis of democracy, and is the virtue which marks the excellence of our form of government over all other forms of government . . . the Ninth Amendment immediately takes its place as the most important declaration in our Constitution, because such a declaration is nowhere else therein to be found.*

Who won the birth-control case? All of the parties to the case, both immediate and remote, lost something, but I personally think that in the Court's recognition of a constitutional right of privacy and in the Court's recognition of the Ninth Amendment, everyone gained a lot.

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The Explosion That Froze the World

ATOMIC DIPLOMACY: HIROSHIMA AND POTSDAM. By Gar Alperovitz. Simon & Schuster. 317 pp. $7.50.

Christopher Lasch

Gar Alperovitz is a young historian trained at Wisconsin, Berkeley and Cambridge; he is presently a fellow of King's College. His book is not polemic but history, done with great care and subtlety and with a keen sense of the limitations of historical "proof." It rests on the works of other historians, on the official records of American diplomacy, on the published memoirs of participants in the events described, and on the important unpublished diary of Henry L. Stimson —in other words, on all the available evidence, in English, bearing on American diplomacy from March to August, 1945.

The book contains hundreds of citations to these sources, to say nothing of scores of additional footnotes carefully expanding on points treated in the text. Because his conclusions differ in important respects from the conclusions of other historians—notably those of Herbert Feis — Alperovitz has taken appropriate care to show, in minute detail, exactly where other historians have gone wrong and why they have gone wrong, and he has done so without rancor or ostentatious display of superior wisdom. In short, he has proceeded in the best traditions of historical scholarship.

The nature of the subject makes it inevitable that *Atomic Diplomacy* will become part of a continuing debate about the origins of the cold war. It is for this reason that I have tried to emphasize the nonpolemical, noninflammatory character of the book. And although I shall be concerned here with showing what light the book throws on the debate over the cold war, I should be doing the book an injustice if I were to give the impression that it has to be justified on the grounds of its immediate contemporary relevance. As an extremely thorough and imaginative exercise in historical reconstruction, based on evidence which is necessarily incomplete and often ambiguous, *Atomic Diplomacy* can stand on its own feet. It will be reviewed and advertised as "controversial" and "provocative," but the most important thing about this book is that it is the work of a historian who knows and respects his craft.

Alperovitz's chief contention is that the atomic bomb had a decisive influence on American diplomacy in the period in question, particularly on American relations with Russia. Alperovitz is *not* attempting to explain why the bomb was used against Japan, still less why it was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki instead of an uninhabited island. He believes that the available evidence does not permit conclusive answers to those questions. It is possible, indeed, that they should not even be asked, because the statesmen who made the "decision" to use the bomb did not see them as questions at all but as foregone conclusions. Truman's celebrated remark about the bomb's having been "no 'great decision,'" often taken simply as a sign of moral callousness (which it was), also points to an important historical truth: the question was not whether to use the bomb but what implications using it would have for our diplomacy. It is those implications, and the way in which they were perceived by the men who knew the secret, which *Atomic Diplomacy* sets out to explore.

As early as April, 1945, according to Alperovitz, American officials from Truman on down had decided to force a "symbolic showdown" with the Soviet Union over the future of Eastern Europe. Truman believed that a unified Europe was the key to European recovery and economic stability, since the agricultural southeast and the industrial northwest depended on each other. Soviet designs on Eastern Europe, Truman reasoned, threatened to disrupt the economic unity of Europe and therefore had to be resisted. The only question was whether the showdown should take place immediately or whether it should be delayed until our bargaining position had improved.

At first it appeared to practically everybody that delay would only weaken our bargaining position. Both of our major bargaining counters, our armies in Europe and our lend-

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Testament of the Ringed Snake

Your eyes are my mirrors.
I wake at noon. I wake in a walk
of somber sun. The earth's unremembering
is in my coil; semblance is the ground grovelling
of what-is met with what-yet-is-not
— adamant bright scales underlaid, overlaid!

My shade is the swift shape that's there
in timedark, Lethean dark of your eye.
If the cold and the dead make you prey,
can you, belly-proud, listen for rebirth?
The black spot draws black weather.
Death's a summer circus, earth-consigned, blood-sweet.

In me, wed descent, ring down
from your noon reflection. Each pool of shining
regathers you, great predator and fancy's
daft rash renegade. I find no vein
of mineral or crystal that can hold you still.
Heat urges mutations. I see you change.

I flick forth my red tongue (never committed to song):
"Perhaps there's lightning of living yet."

Sam Bradley

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lease credits, could be more effectively employed at once, it seemed, than at any future time. Accordingly, Truman tried to "lay it on the line" with the Russians. He demanded that they "carry out their [Yalta] agreements" by giving the pro-Western elements in Poland an equal voice in the Polish Government (although Roosevelt, who made the Yalta agreements, believed that "we placed, as clearly shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis" on the Warsaw [pro-Communist] government than on the pro-Western leaders). When Stalin objected that Poland was "a country in which the USSR is interested first of all and most of all," the United States tried to force him to give in by cutting back lend-lease payments to Russia.

At this point, however—probably on April 25—Secretary of War Stimson convinced Truman that "we shall probably hold more cards in our hands later than now." He referred of course, to the atomic bomb, and if Truman decided to postpone the showdown with Russia, it was because Stimson and other advisers persuaded him that the new weapon would "put us in a position," as Secretary of State James F. Byrnes argued, "to dictate our own terms at the end of the war."

To the amazement of those not privy to the secret, Truman proceeded to take a more conciliatory attitude toward Russia, an attitude symbolized by the Hopkins mission to Moscow in June, 1945. Meanwhile, he twice postponed the meeting with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam. Churchill complained, "Anyone can see that in a very short space of time our armed power on the Continent will have vanished." But when Truman told Churchill that an atomic bomb had been successfully exploded at Alamogordo, exceeding all expectations, Churchill immediately understood and endorsed the strategy of delay. "We were in the presence of a new factor in human affairs," he said, "and possessed of powers which were irresistible." Not only Germany but even the Balkans, which Churchill and Roosevelt had formerly conceded to the Russian sphere, now seemed amenable to Western influence. That assumption, of course, had guided American policy since April, but it could not be acted upon until the bombing of Japan provided the world with an unmistakable demonstration of American military supremacy.

Early in September, the foreign ministers of the Big Three met in London. Byrnes—armed, as Stimson noted, with "the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing"—tried to press the American advantage. He demanded that the governments of Bulgaria and Rumania reorganize themselves along lines favorable to the West. In Bulgaria, firmness won a few concessions; in Rumania, the Russians stood firm. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, made a telling comment on American policy. "Why," he asked, "did you Americans wait till right now to begin opposing us in the Balkans and Eastern Europe? You should have done this three years ago. Now it is too late, and your complaints only arouse suspicions here."

Alperovitz does not comment on the remarkable events he describes, but they point implicitly to two conclusions. In the first place, the object of American policy in the first months of the cold war was not to defend Western or even Central Europe but to force the Soviet Union out of Eastern Europe. The Soviet menace to the "free world," so often cited as the justification of the containment policy, simply did not exist in the minds of American planners. They believed themselves to be negotiating not from weakness but from almost unassailable superiority. Nor can it be said that the cold war began because the Russians "broke their agreements." The general sense of the Yalta agreements—which were in any case very vague—was to assign to the Soviet Union a controlling influence in Eastern Europe. Armed with the atomic bomb, American diplomats tried to take back what they had implicitly conceded at Yalta.

The assumption of American moral superiority, in short, does not stand up under analysis. That conclusion leads to a second: that American diplomacy in the early stages of the cold war must be judged strictly by the standards of power politics, if it is to be judged a success. But the inescapable fact is that, even by that test, it completely failed to win its objectives. Atomic supremacy did not, as Byrnes had hoped, enable us to "dictate our terms." Instead it merely encouraged what William A. Williams has called the "illusion of omnipotence." Stimson himself, the architect of the strategy of delay, was the first to realize that its failure dictated a new approach to the Russians, designed to internationalize atomic power. The alternative, he now saw, was an arms race which would imperil the world for years to come.

The only defense of American diplomacy which Alperovitz's book leaves intact is the defense made by unthinking anti-Communists, that it is sound policy to oppose Communist power anywhere, at any time, by whatever means come to hand. Such a defense can be made, but it can hardly claim to go by the name of realism. Realism demands a more accurate assessment of one's own power to control events. The failure to understand the limits of our own power, it is now clear, has undermined our foreign policy at every turn.

Scientists and Policy at Ground Zero

A PERIL AND A HOPE: The Scientists' Movement in America. By Alice Kimball Smith. University of Chicago Press. 591 pp. $10.

Elinor Langer

A Peril and a Hope is an almost day-by-day account of the problems and accomplishments of atomic scientists in the years 1945-47, as they moved out of their laboratories to attempt to influence political decisions about the disposition of the bomb they had constructed. It is a detailed and loving book, the kind some mothers keep about their babies, and it suffers from some of the same defects. The problem is not exactly lack of objectivity: no facts are twisted, events distorted or evaluations biased. What is missing is perspective. It is as if a mother recorded "July 20: today Johnny said 'Mama' "—but neglected to note that Johnny was 5 when the event took place. Nobody could have taken the trouble to write this book unless he assumed that the scientists about whom he wrote were seated firmly in the center of the universe during the years in question. In Mrs. Smith's case it seems likely that this conviction grew out of affection and close association: during the war her husband was one of

Elinor Langer writes on politics for Science *magazine.*

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the scientists at the Los Alamos laboratory where the first bombs were assembled; later she herself worked on the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, the most enduring and significant emblem of the scientists' political commitment. But even her own exhaustive scholarship fails to prove the point. The result is that while *A Peril and a Hope* is a highly competent book, difficult to criticize on its own terms, its own terms are a trifle ludicrous. More seriously, the book contributes to a fundamental misconception that has now reached such large proportions that a fresh article examining it appears nearly weekly: the Myth of the Important Scientists.

Like all myths, the Myth of the Important Scientists reflects some elementary truth — in this case, the fact that scientists *are* more important than they used to be. Before World War II, science was a private occupation, sometimes pursued at great sacrifice, pursued almost always in isolation from politics and from society. Now scientists are part of the national establishment. They preside over a research and development budget now approaching $16 billion annually. They advise the President and members of the Cabinet on a wide range of public-policy issues. They administer large government bureaucracies in the fields of medical, nuclear and basic research. They sit on panels deciding how federal research dollars should be distributed. They are presidents of universities. They head successful corporations in aerospace and other new fields. They organize for LBJ. A few will be going to the moon.

Since the Hiroshima bomb marks for many people the great divide between Then and Now, it is natural that they have looked to the early postwar period for the source of the scientists' alleged political power. But even in the most fluid period, the power of the scientists was much overrated. The physically concentrated conditions of wartime work on the bomb encouraged a corporate sense among atomic scientists. The bomb elicited passionate introspection and moral concern. Droves of scientists flocked to Washington to see what they could do. They set up an organization known as the Federation of American Scientists. They worked feverishly, often without salaries, talking to Congressmen, cajoling editors and reporters, lecturing to the public, trying to explain what atomic energy was, and how the government might safely cope

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with it. But the truth was they could do very little. They revolutionized the life of the scientific community, but their revolution had relatively little impact on your life and mine.

From 1945 to 1947 the scientists were involved in three main problems. The first was the question—if there ever really was a question—about whether to use the bomb against Japan. Acting within the rigid limits of Manhattan Project security, many scientists, particularly those at the Chicago laboratory, whose role in building the bomb was largely completed before the closing months of the war, made intense efforts to bring a variety of alternatives before United States policy makers. A famous poll suggests that they never spoke with a single voice but tended essentially to take a long-range view. Some scientists argued for a nonmilitary demonstration of the bomb; others advocated warning Japan in advance and seeking to end the war without such massive slaughter. Many also urged that the fact of the bomb's existence be shared with Russia (which it never fully was) and that an early start be made on plans for postwar control. But the scientists who were most influential in the government and who had mediated between the government and the bomb project throughout the war tended to view the question with the shorter range vision that prevailed in Washington. In a report to the War Department, top scientists—including men like Oppenheimer and Compton—finally concluded that "we can see no acceptable alternative to direct military use" [of the bomb]. Whether the sometimes eloquent counterarguments of the scientists in the field went read or unread in Washington is essentially irrelevant. This episode foreshadowed a phenomenon that now occurs continually. The closer scientists are to government, the less likely they are to take a stand on unfashionable premises or contribute new modes of analysis. In a sense, "administration scientists" are more "administration" than "scientists," and as they cease to express a viewpoint that can be called "independent," they have neither more nor less power than other government functionaries. More important in assessing scientists' influence on the decision to bomb Japan, are the political and diplomatic considerations stressed in the book by Gar Alperovitz, also reviewed in this issue. United States decision makers paid some attention to the moral and other questions raised by the scientists, but they weighed more heavily other matters on their minds.

Arguments about the bomb were carried on under the tightest secrecy. The first fight in which the atomic scientists were publicly prominent was the postwar struggle over what kind of domestic atomic energy agency Congress should establish, and whether it should be controlled by civilians or by the military. The Manhattan Project was run by the military. Security measures were heavy. There was strict compartmentation: two scientists working in the same laboratory on related topics could not communicate with each other about their work unless one had a clear "need to know." Virtually no research could be published.

The scientists came to hate the army brass who ran the isolated enclaves where they worked and who, they thought, totally misunderstood the nature of scientific research. They feared that continued military control would not only interfere with their work in nuclear physics but would appear belligerent to the rest of the world and seriously handicap the research on peaceful uses of atomic energy they hoped to undertake. On this point the scientists won their only major battle: after a lengthy fight, the Atomic Energy Commission was established under civilian rule. But the result was disappointing. In almost no time the AEC became what amounted to a civilian arm of the military. While the agency is not itself belligerent, it has contributed docilely to the development of international tensions: its main job until recently has been simply to produce fissionable material for the military.

Often the progress in peaceful uses of atomic energy has been so slow it is not even in the same league with military applications. And the security provisions are not exactly a model for the ACLU. This is not to say that the atomic scientists were at fault. Individuals might have reached private nirvanas by burning their clearances and refusing to build more bombs, but collectively they were powerless to make the AEC turn out the way they hoped.

A third measure of the scientists' influence is an event that is surprisingly unremembered. Perhaps dearer to the atomic scientists than the domestic arrangements for atomic energy was their belief in the need for some kind of international control. They were

The Medium

It is essentially reluctance the language
a darkness, a friendship, tying to the real
but it is unreal

the clarity desired, a wish for true sight,
all tangling

'you' tried me, tried the everyday which
caught me, turning the house

in the wind, a lovecraft the political
was not my business I could not look

without seeing the decay, the shit poured
on most things, by indifference, the personal

power which is simply that, demanding a friend
take dullness out of the world (he doesn't know
his lousy emptiness) I slept
in a fire on my book bag, one dried wing

of a white moth the story is of a man
who lost his way in the holy wood

because the way had never been taken without
at least two friends, one on each side,

and I believe my dream said one of the others
always led now left to acknowledge,

he can't breathe, the darkness bled
the white wing, one of the body

of the moth that moved him, of the other
wing, the language is bereft

Robin Blaser

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overwhelmingly surprised by the flexible position outlined in the Acheson-Lilienthal report which, with key modifications (in the direction of toughness), became the keystone of the U.S. position in the first talks on international control at the United Nations in the summer of 1946. The scientists endorsed the report and worked hard to gain its acceptance. Two weeks and two days after the U. S. plan was unveiled, the United States set off an atomic bomb at Bikini. Mrs. Smith remarks with some surprise that the military had played almost no role at all in formulating the U. S. disarmament proposals. They didn't need to. They had plans of their own—whose execution caused *Red Star* to point out that the U. S. seemed more interested in perfecting the bomb than in limiting it. Many people feel that Bikini had a lot to do with the hardening Soviet suspicions of U. S. intentions, and, therefore, with the cold war. Again, the point is not that the scientists were in the slightest measure at fault. It is that other concerns and other people were shaping our lives and in these decisions the scientists were only marginally involved. They were just as helpless as the rest of us.

The record of the 1945-47 period is not such a sturdy one: two losses—dropping the bomb, and the failure to achieve international controls; and one doubtful victory—the civilian Atomic Energy Commission. In the end, the one thing the scientists seem to have done that really touched our lives was to invent first one bomb, then another. It seems to me it is the same way now. We are still vulnerable to the products of their laboratories. But in political matters the scientists are like the rest of us—mastered rather than masters.

THEATRE

Henry Popkin

INTERNATIONAL THEATRE INSTITUTE

Tel Aviv

At the recent congress of the International Theatre Institute in Tel Aviv, an East European delegate whom I had never met before abruptly announced to me: *"Vous êtes un ange."* This happens to be true, but I was surprised that the Eastern bloc knew it and thought it worth mentioning at this moment. When the delegate went on, in French, to praise my generosity and to urge me to visit his country, I realized that I had been mistaken for the UNESCO representative. I could not think of a graceful way of correcting the error, and so I tried discreetly to direct attention to the badge that identified me as an American delegate. Finally, I could do no more than to promise a visit next year to the country in question; at the first opportunity, I informed the UNESCO representative that one of the East Europeans was looking for him.

Imperfect as it was, the encounter was characteristic of the ITI. This body exists to promote international communication among theatre people, and the estimable goal must often have as one of its by-products international conversation at cross-purposes, or even international misapprehension. I prize the ITI precisely for the opportunity it provides for a continuing dialogue among nations. It is in order to keep up my part in the conversation that I keep attending the ITI congresses—Vienna in 1961, Warsaw in 1963, Tel Aviv in 1965. I might even go to New York in 1967.

The official business of the ITI is no more exciting than the official business of most conventions, but some of its incidental reverberations are significant. The formal discussions that follow are sporadically interesting. What is really important is the possibility, realized in various ways, of communication with the great theatre world of Europe and especially with that mysterious universe behind the iron curtain. The cultural thaw goes on; it continues and develops, even in the face of the war in Vietnam.

Consider that Rumania, which used to be rather resistant to the thaw, has now officially permitted the free choice of artistic forms. I trust there is no penalty for failing to express oneself freely, but I am reminded of a line from an *avant-garde* Czech play, Václav Havel's *The Garden Party* (itself a sign of the times): "Everybody who is honestly interested in our common cause should have from one to three contrary opinions." Gradually, East Europe has been becoming less of an indistinguishable inchoate mass. But the Soviet Union stands aloof.

Enlightening dialogues are not confined to exchanges across the iron curtain. Sometimes even the nations of the West can startle one another. When, in 1963, I made a passing reference to the extraordinary off-Broadway success of Jean Genet's *The Blacks* in New York, a French delegate rose to express his surprise. How was this possible, he wondered, in view of the American racial situation of which we have heard so much? He supplied his own answer to this hard question: The success of *The Blacks* must be due to the integrationist policy which is led by President Kennedy. This year, during the formal discussion of the classics on the modern stage, I was speaking up in defense of certain free reinterpretations, like Roger Planchon's *Henry IV: Part One* and *George Dandin* in France and Jerzy Grotowski's *Doctor Faustus* in Poland, when a French delegate attacked, with surprising sharpness, the inauthenticity of Planchon's *George Dandin* (which was an example of right-wing conservative interpretation in comparison with his *Henry IV*). Alan Schneider, who was an American delegate, remarked dryly that he had been meaning to ask what the French Establishment thought of Planchon, whose work he admired; he supposed that now he knew.

Even though the official languages of the congress are English and French, the Russians always speak Russian and bring their own translator. (In 1963, they moved that the tongue of Pushkin and Chekhov be made one of the official languages of the meeting; the motion failed.) Some of the Russians do, unofficially, speak English and French, but they evidently prefer not to do so. The language barrier serves to isolate the Russians; at the concluding banquet of the session at Haifa, for example, a Soviet delegate made the principal address, which was then translated into Hebrew, and so remained a mystery to most of those present. I am informed that he deplored the decision to discuss the classics on the modern stage at this year's meeting. This complaint again reflects the "official" stiffness of the Soviet position. It reminded me that two years before, the Russians—while objecting to the prevailing pessimism of Western drama

Henry Popkin frequently writes on the theatre for Vogue *and other magazines.*

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—had complained that the West had not sent its leading, deplorable dramatists to that year's discussion of the dramatist and his audience. Why were Duerrenmatt and Ionesco and Tennessee Williams not present? The question was valid, but the Russians had no dramatists in their delegation either. The Russians, unlike the rest of the East Europeans, seem determined not to be "with it." (The only communicative Russian I met this year was a cultural attaché who drove me from Haifa to Tel Aviv and urged me to collect stamps.) On two occasions at this year's meeting, the Russians found themselves voting against most of their East European allies. One of these votes occurred when the Polish delegation led a revolt against the leadership of the ITI. The Polish revolt was largely symbolic; the Poles did not, I believe, object to the character of the leadership or of its official slate of candidates for the next executive committee, but only to their existence. Proposing two additional candidates, a Polish delegate told an illustrative anecdote in the form of a fable: God created Eve and then told Adam: "You have now grown to man's estate. You are an adult, capable of mature, reasoned choice. Now tell me, and decide carefully, whom do you want to marry?" God, he explained, was the present executive committee, Eve was the new slate, and Adam was the congress. In a close vote, the official slate won, but those who opposed it comprised a strange alliance — the Scandinavian nations and the so-called satellites of East Europe. Alone among the Communist nations, the Soviet Union voted on the side of the Establishment.

Another curious division accompanied one of the few truly dramatic moments at this drama conference. Invitations for the 1967 congress were issued by the United States, Canada and Hungary, but it was clear at once that only the American bid would be taken seriously. The Colombian and Canadian delegates asked if American visas could be obtained for everyone who wanted to attend. The American chairman, Rosamund Gilder, who is also president of the ITI, replied that she had been promised cooperation from the State Department, and pointed out that even nations not on friendly terms with the United States manage to be represented at the United Nations in New York. One delegate arose to observe sadly that his nation did not belong to the United Nations; he was, of course, an East German. At last, the Hungarian delegate effectively terminated the discussion by rather gallantly expressing his hope for a successful congress in New York, offering to renew Budapest's bid only if American visas were not forthcoming. The congress voted unanimously to hold its next meeting in New York; four countries—the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria and Colombia—abstained. I imagine that the Soviet Union weighed, with proper tolerance, the self-indulgent desire of the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and Rumanians to go to New York, but concluded that East Germany was in more need of moral support.

The discussion, when we finally reached that long-promised topic, the classics on the modern stage, produced no division along political lines. It was considerably more animated than the Warsaw discussions which had consisted mainly of the reading of formal, frequently irrelevant papers, interrupted only by the eloquent protest of an Israeli actress who wanted to hear some real discussion.

This year, the delegates refought the battle of the ancients and moderns as they revealed themselves to be partisans of traditional or "modernized" versions of the classics. The American delegates who participated in these talks were consistently "modern" — Schneider, Richard Schechner of *Tulane Drama Review*, and myself — and we were joined by the Rumanian director, Liviu Ciulei, and Luigi Squarzina of Italy, who told how he had interpreted *Troilus and Cressida* as an antiwar play of contemporary significance and had clad Cressida in a bikini. An East European, irked by the emphasis on costume, asked derisively who was the best-dressed Hamlet we had ever seen. The case for a conservative approach to the classics was stated more elaborately by two French delegates, the director Jean Meyer (formerly of the Comédie Française), who provided French instances of the influence of historical circumstance upon dramatic form, and A. M. Julian, of the Theatre of the Nations in Paris, who called upon the director only to respect the play and not to express himself. Such differences could only be aired and not resolved, but the dialogue continues and that's what cultural conventions are for.

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